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A response to O. Arandjelovic’s  critique of “The reproducibility of research 
and the misinterpretation of p-values” 
 
David Colquhoun, UCL 
First some minor matters. 
I his critique of my 2017 paper (1), Arandjelovic says (2) that my argument “provides 
little if any justification for the continued use of the p-value”.  I agree because I never 
contended that it did.  I recommended (3) that authors should  
 “In my proposal, the terms “significant” and “nonsignificant” would not be 
used at all. This change has been suggested by many other people, but these 
suggestions have had little or no effect on practice. A p-value and confidence 
interval would still be stated but they would be supplemented by a single extra 
number that gives a better measure of the strength of the evidence than is 
provided by the p-value” 
Furthermore calculation of the p value is the simplest way to calculate what I believe 
really matters, the false positive risk. It is an input to our web calculator.(4). 
He also says (2) “Although criticisms [of p values] are not new, until recently they 
were largely confined to the niche of the statistical community.”.  Actually criticisms 
have been voiced by users for a long time as exemplified by the opening quotation in 
my paper.  Baken, writing in the Psychological Bulletin in 1966 (5) described the 
conventional null-hypothesis testing as an emperor who had no clothes.  I would 
agree that these early warnings have had little effect on practice, but the reason for 
that is not primarily a statistical one, but rather a consequence of the perverse 
incentives that are imposed on both authors and journal editors to produce 
discoveries without worrying too much about whether the results are just chance. 
The major criticism 
The main criticism of my piece in ref (2) seems to be that my calculations rely on 
testing a point null hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that the true effect size is zero.  He 
objects to my contention that the true effect size can be zero, “just give the same pill 
to both groups”, on the grounds that two pills can’t be exactly identical. He then says 
“I understand that this criticism may come across as frivolous semantic pedantry of 
no practical consequence: “of course that the author meant to say ‘pills with the 
same contents’ as everybody would have understood”.  Yes, that is precisely how it 
comes across to me. I shall try to explain in more detail why I think that this criticism 
has little substance. 
Nevertheless I’m grateful to Arandjelovic(2) because his invective has given me the 
chance to discuss in a bit more detail the assumptions behind my views.  Many of his 
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criticisms have already been answered in my 2019 paper (3), which has been online 
in arXiv for a year.  
One puzzling aspect of his criticisms is that they don’t mention the crucial matter of 
likelihood ratios. 
Likelihood ratios 
In my 2017 paper (1), I suggested three different ways of expressing uncertainty that 
improved on giving p values alone. One was to use the reverse Bayes approach to 
calculate the prior probability that you’d need to believe in order to achieve a 
specified FPR. This overcomes the fact that that we usually have no information 
about the prior probability.  But it has the disadvantage that it risks creating a “bright 
line” at FPR = 0.05, and that sort of dichotomisation is universally deplored (6). It 
also has the disadvantage that the idea of a prior probability is slippery and 
unfamiliar to most users. 
As an alternative approach, I suggested giving the likelihood ratio, or its equivalent 
FPR based on the assumption that the prior probability is 0.5.  This is now my first 
choice (3).  The likelihood ratio (or Bayes’ factor) is the bit of Bayes’ theorem that 
represents the strength of the evidence from the experiment, so it is the most natural 
thing to use (7).  It measures how probable your observations would be under the 
hypothesis that there is a real effect, relative to how probable they would be under 
the null hypothesis of zero effect.  Call this ratio L10. The biggest value that this can 
take is that when the alternative hypothesis has its most likely value, the observed 
mean effect size. It turns out that even this maximum evidence in favour of the 
alternative does not reject the null hypothesis as often as the traditional p value. It’s 
well known that if you observe p = 0.05, the likelihood ratio in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis is only around 3 (e.g. ref (7) and section 10 in ref (8)). Odds of 
3 to 1 on their being a real effect are far less than the odds of 19:1 which might, 
mistakenly, be inferred from p = 0.05. 
This approach avoids altogether the arguments about Bayes’ theorem. It is an 
entirely frequentist approach, and it is sufficient alone to show that the p value, as it 
is often mistakenly interpreted, exaggerates the evidence against the null 
hypothesis.  
Notice that the likelihood ratio approach does not assert that the true effect size is 
exactly zero. It merely says that if L10 is small, then the evidence that there is a real 
effect is weak.  From this point of view it’s irrelevant that the null hypothesis is that 
the true effect size is exactly zero.  If the likelihood ratio is not sufficiently big in 
favour of a real effect to conclude that a real effect is unlikely, then one obviously 
doesn’t conclude that the effect size is exactly zero.  
It’s important to realise that there are two different ways in which the likelihood ratio 
can be calculated. In most discussions this is ignored, or at least not stated explicitly, 
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and this has led to confusion. The distinction between them is old. Lindley (1957) 
pointed it out 
“In fact, the paradox arises because the significance level argument is based 
on the area under a curve and the Bayesian argument is based on the 
ordinate of the curve.” — D.V. Lindley (1957) [17, p.190]. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1 of ref. (1).  Astonishingly there seem to be no generally 
accepted names for the two approaches. I called them the p-equals approach and 
the p-less-than approach, and the distinction between them is discussed in detail in 
section 3 of my 2017 paper (1) so I won’t repeat it here.  Most people still use the 
latter approach, though the former is clearly appropriate for answering my question:  
how should you interpret the p value from a single unbiased experiment.  For any 
given p value, the p-equals approach gives smaller likelihood ratio, or bigger false 
positive risk, than the p-less-than approach (see Figure 2 in ref (1)).  Neglect of this 
distinction has led some people to underestimate the risk of false positives. 
One problem with advocating likelihood ratios as a measure of evidence is that they 
are unfamiliar to most users, and that there is no generally accepted criterion for how 
big they must be for you to have reasonable confidence that your results aren’t a 
result of chance alone.  That is why I suggested that, rather than specifying the result 
as L10 it should be given as FPR50 = 1/(1 + L10).  
This can be interpreted, using Bayes’ theorem, as the FPR when the prior odds are 
1, i.e. when the prior probability of a real effect is 0.5 (e.g. see equation A6 in ref (3).  
The advantage of doing this is that the FPR measures what most people still 
mistakenly think the p value does. That makes it very easy for non-statisticians to 
understand.  But the disadvantage is that it involves Bayes’ theorem and that always 
means an outbreak of the statistics wars. 
Insofar as the FPR50 is just a transformation of L10, it is entirely frequentist, but its 
interpretation as a posterior probability is not. 
  
How much do p values (as commonly misinterpreted) exaggerate the evidence 
against the null hypothesis? 
Much of the argument in this area centres on whether or not p values (as commonly 
misinterpreted) exaggerate the strength of the evidence against the null hypothesis.  
Most people think that they do, though the extent of the exaggeration depends on 
the precise assumptions that you make.   
Everyone agrees that the p value is not the probability that your results occur by 
chance alone, despite that being the most common interpretation placed on it by 
users.  The fact that so many people believe this misinterpretation suggests that 
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what they want to know is the probability that their results are due to chance alone, 
so we need a proper definition of that term.  In my 2017 paper(1) I define it this way.   
“. . .  when a statistical test of significance comes out positive, what the 
probability is that you have a false positive, i.e. there is no real effect and the 
results have occurred by chance. This probability is defined here as the false 
positive risk (FPR)”. 
One way of looking at the difference between the p value and the FPR is to note that 
they have different denominators. The numerator is the number of false positives in 
hypothetical replications of the experiment. If the criterion for a positive result is p < 
0.05, then this will be 5% of all tests in which the null hypothesis is true. The p value 
is the ratio of this number of false positives to the total number of tests in which the 
null hypothesis is true. The FPR is the ratio of the number of false positives to the 
total number of positive tests, both false positives and true positives.  Under realistic 
conditions, the former denominator is larger so the p value is smaller than the FPR   
A numerical example is given at 26:00 in (9).   
Another way to look at the difference between p value and FPR is to look at 
confusion between them as an example of the error of the transposed conditional 
Colquhoun (10).  They measure quite different things so, in principle, they cannot be 
equal. 
If we accept that what we want to know is the FPR, the question arises of how to 
calculate it, and that’s where the problems begin.  From a Bayesian point of view, the 
FPR is the posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true, P(H0 | data). There 
are differences of opinion about how it should be calculated. Because it is a 
Bayesian concept there is literally an infinitude of ways in which it can be calculated. 
Held & Ott (2018) (11) have reviewed the many possibilities. Which way should we 
choose? 
As Senn (12) has pointed out, the disagreements about how to calculate FPR are 
essentially disagreements between different versions of the Bayesian argument, 
rather than a disagreement between frequentists and Bayesians.  Frequentists have 
no way to calculate FPR.   
Some people (eg  Casella & Berger (13)) have argued that putting a lump of prior 
probability on the null hypothesis gives the null an unfair advantage over other 
possibilities.  This is a matter of opinion. It seems quite fair to me.  Casella & Berger 
(1987) (14) say 
“Their main thesis is that the frequentist P-value overstates the evidence 
against the null hypothesis although the Bayesian posterior probability of the 
null hypothesis is a more sensible measure.” 
“The large posterior probability of H0 that Berger and Delampady compute is a 
result of the large prior probability they assign to H0, a prior probability that is 
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much larger than is reasonable for most problems in which point null tests are 
used.” 
“In fact, it is not the case that P-values are too small, but rather that Bayes 
point null posterior probabilities are much too big!” 
“Most researchers would not put a 50% prior probability on Ho. The purpose 
of an experiment is often to disprove Ho and researchers are not performing 
experiments that they believe, a priori, will fail half the time!  We would be 
surprised if most researchers would place even a 10% prior probability on 
Ho.” 
Casella and Berger (14) seem to have much more faith in the ability of 
experimenters to guess the outcome of an experiment than I think is appropriate.  
Most bright ideas turn out to be wrong so I would guess that a prior probability of 0.5 
there being a real effect is often optimistic, rather than being much too low.  In my 
analysis, observation of p = 0.05 would imply a prior, P(H1) of 0.87 to make the FPR 
the same as the p value (4).  They contend that this is reasonable. I think that if you 
were to submit a paper that claimed you’d made a discovery and that a necessary 
assumption for that claim to be true was that you were almost (90%) certain that the 
claimed effect was real before you did the experiment, your paper would be unlikely 
be accepted.  Casella & Berger seem to think that it’s legitimate to adjust your prior 
in order to make the FPR more or less the same as the p value.  This makes no 
sense at all to me. 
I chose to use a point null hypothesis as prior and to use a simple alternative 
hypothesis ((3), (11)).  This makes sense because it’s exactly what you do when you 
simulate repeated t tests, as in Colquhoun (2014) (8).  The rest of the prior 
probability is on the alternative hypothesis, and when this is given its most likely 
value, the observed mean effect size we find that the likelihood ratio is, at most, 
about 3, as above.   
At the other extreme Senn (12) has shown that a prior can be chosen (for one-sided 
tests) that makes the p value essentially identical with the FPR. But since the FPR 
and the p value measure quite different things there is no earthly reason why they 
should be the same.  This seems about as sensible as saying that you can always 
choose a prior probability that makes the p value the same as the FPR.  Without 
hard evidence about the accuracy of the priors are assumed these are mere parlour 
tricks. 
The use of a simple alternative hypothesis is not crucial for my results. Other 
approaches give similar results, as shown in ref (3).  In particular the approaches of 
Sellke et al, 2001 (15), and of Johnson (2013) (16) give results that are quite close to 
mine, using priors for the alternative hypothesis that are designed to maximise the 
odds in favour of rejection of the null hypothesis, H0.  It turns out that they reject the 
null hypothesis much less often than the p value. These conclusions strengthen still 
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further the view that the p values, as commonly misinterpreted, exaggerate the 
strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. The false positive risk, under any 
realistic assumptions, is bigger than the p value and this must, to some extent, 
contribute to the reproducibility crisis.  
 
Conclusions 
It’s true that putting a lump of prior probability on the null hypothesis gives a bigger 
FPR (for any given p value) than other choices of prior.  In that sense my values 
should perhaps be viewed as maximum FPRs.  But in a different sense they are 
minimum FPRs, because prior probabilities of a real effect may well be lower than 
the default value of 0.5.   
The fact that the Bayesian approach with a lump of prior probability on the null 
hypothesis gives results that are identical with simply counting false positives in 
repeated simulations of t tests, is another reason to think that this approach is 
reasonable (8).  
I’d be quite happy for people to report, along with the p value and confidence 
intervals, the likelihood ratio, L10 , that gives the odds in favour of there being a real 
effect, relative to there being no true effect.  That is a frequentist measure and it 
measures the evidence that’s provided by the experiment.   
If these odds are expressed as a probability, rather than as odds, we could cite, 
rather than L10, the corresponding probability 1/(1 + L10).  I suggest that a sensible 
notation for this probability is FPR50, because it can, in Bayesian context, be 
interpreted as the false positive risk when you assume a prior probability of 0.5.  But 
since it depends only on the likelihood ratio, there is no necessity to interpret it in that 
way, and it would save a lot of argument if one didn’t. 
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